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Adherence to the Code: Justice Antonin Scalia’s
Italian American Jurisprudence
By: Michael Spizzuco

2

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia is arguably the most controversial Justice on the
United States Supreme Court. Justice Scalia is known for his scathing dissents and origina list
views. This paper analyzes Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence and asserts that a motivating factor in
Justice Scalia’s decision-making is his Italian-American heritage. Part I of this paper offers a
biography of Justice Scalia.

Part II introduces the theory of this paper and Justice Scalia’s

jurisprudential approach. Finally, Part III summarizes ten (10) Supreme Court Opinions authored
by Justice Scalia and explains how his decision in each opinion relates to his Italian-Amer ica n
heritage.
I.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Antonin Gregory Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey, on March 11, 1936.

1

Justice

Scalia was born to Salvatore Eugene Scalia, a Sicilian immigrant who eventually became a
professor of romance languages at Brooklyn College, and Catherine Scalia, an elementary school
teacher.

2

When Justice Scalia was six years old, his family moved from Trenton to Elmhur st,

Queens.

3

Upon completion of middle school, Justice Scalia was awarded a scholarship to attend

the prestigious Xavier High School in Manhattan. After graduating first in his class at Xavier 4 ,
Justice Scalia attended Georgetown University for his undergraduate studies.

Justice Scalia

graduated from Georgetown as class valedictorian and summa cum laude with a degree in History
in 1957. 5 For his graduate studies, Justice Scalia attended Harvard Law School and graduated
magna cum laude in 1960, while also attaining the Sheldon Fellowship of Harvard University.

1

6

Molotski, Irwin, "The Supreme Court: Man in the News; Judge with tenacity and charm: Antonin Scalia", The New
York Times, (June 18, 1986), retrieved August 23, 2014.
2 Biskupic, Joan, American Original: The Life and Constitution of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia , Sarah
Crichton Books, pp. 11-15. (2009).
3 Biskupic pp. 17-19.
4 Marcus, Ruth, "Scalia tenacious after staking out a position", The Washington Post, (June 22, 1986), retrieved August
23, 2014.
5 Molotski (1986).
6 Fox, John, Biographies of the Robes: Antonin Gregory Scalia, pbs.org, retrieved August 23, 2014.
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From 1961 through 1967, Justice Scalia served as an associate for the firm Jones, Day,
Cockle and Reavis in Cleveland, Ohio.

7

Justice Scalia soon moved his family to Charlottesville,

Virginia where he spent four years as a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia.

8

After

four years teaching at the University of Virginia, President Richard Nixon appointed Justice Scalia
as the general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy. From 1972 until 1974, Justice
Scalia served as the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States.

9

Halfway

through 1974, President Nixon nominated Justice Scalia as an Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel.

10

Justice Scalia taught at University of Chicago Law School from 1977

continuing through 1982. 11 He did, however, spend one year as a visiting professor at Stanford
Law School.

12

In early 1982, Justice Scalia was offered a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in Chicago. However, Justice Scalia turned the position down, hoping instead
to be appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In mid1982, Justice Scalia got his wish when President Ronald Reagan appointed him to the D.C. Circuit.
13

While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia’s scathing opinions caught the attention of the

Reagan administration officials.

14

In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger stated his intent to retire.

President Reagan nominated Associate Justice William Rehnquist to be the Chief Justice, however,

7

Scalia Speaks in Ames, Scolds Aggressive Student, Harvard Law Record, December 7, 2006, retrieved August 23,
2014.
8 Biskupic (2009), pp. 37-38
9 Fox.
10 Fox.
11 Shipp, E. R., "Scalia's Midwestern colleagues cite his love of debate, poker, and piano", The New York Times, (July
26, 1986), retrieved August 23, 2014.
12 Staab, James, The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian on the Supreme Court , Rowman &
Littlefield, (2006).
13 Biskupic (2009), pp.80.
14 Taylor, Stuart, "Scalia's views, stylishly expressed, line up with Reagan's", The New York Times, (June 19, 1986),
retrieved August 23, 2014.
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that left a position as Associate Justice open.

15

President Reagan nominated Judge Scalia

16

and

the Senate unanimously confirmed him on September 17, 1986, allowing Justice Scalia to become
the first Italian-American Supreme Court Justice.

17

There has been some controversy of Justice Scalia’s confirmation, however. The Senate
Judiciary Committee overseeing Justice Scalia’s confirmation had just finished affirming Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s nomination, which proved challenging.

According to witnesses and

Democratic Senators, Justice Rehnquist has engaged in activities designed to discourage minorities
from voting.

18

Further, the Senate Judiciary Committee had learned that the proposed Chief

Justice wrote a legal memorandum for Justice Robert H. Jackson on the landmark Brown v. Board
of Education 19 case. The memo read: “I realize it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position,
for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues, but I think Plessy v. Ferguson 20 was right
and should be reaffirmed.”

21

Of course, a plain meaning of this memorandum would offer the

conclusion that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not support integration of public school systems.
Accordingly, the Committee members did not wish to battle over a second nomination and were
reluctant to oppose the first Italian-American nominee.
II.

22

JUDICIAL APPROACH
Justice Scalia is a self-described originalist, meaning that he interprets provisions of the

United States Constitution as it would have been understood when the provision was put into

15

Biskipic (2009), pp. 104-109.
Biskipic (2009), pp. 104-109.
17 Dautrich, Kenneth; Yalof, Alistair Yalof. American government: historical, popular, and glob al perspectives.
Cengage Learning. p. 241. (2009).
18 Biskupic (2009), pp. 100, 109–110.
19 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
21 Liptak, Adam. New Look at an Old Memo Casts More Doubt on Rehnquist. The New York Times, published March
19, 2012. Retrieved November 25, 2014.
22 Biskupic 2009, pp. 100, 109–110.
16
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effect. According to the Justice himself, “It’s what did the words mean to the people who ratified
the Bill of Rights or who ratified the Constitution.”

23

This, therefore, means that Justice Scalia

believes Amendments to the Constitution are also to be interpreted based upon their meaning at
the time the Amendment was passed.

24

Further, Justice Scalia opposes other scholars who

speculate about the intent of the drafters and the view that the Supreme Court must interpret the
language of the Constitution figuratively.

25

Moreover, Justice Scalia is vehemently opposed to

the concept of a living constitution, meaning, the power of the judiciary to modify the
interpretation and meaning of constitutional provisions to adapt to the changing ideals of society.
26

Similar to his views on constitutional interpretation, Justice Scalia is a textualist regarding

statutory interpretation. This school of thought believes that the ordinary and plain reading of the
statute should govern its application and meaning. In interpreting statutes, Justice Scalia refuses
to reference or take into consideration the legislative history behind said statutes.27 This approach
and Justice Scalia’s decisions are due, in part, to his Italian-American heritage.
In Italian-American culture, family is incredibly important.

28

According to Thomas and

Mary Shaffer, “It was the family, not the individual, that moved from the highly protective enclave
of the old way (la via vecchia) to concern (campanilismo) for place of origin (paese) and for the
extended family that eventually resulted from this broader community of concern (paesani).” 29

23

Justice Scalia on the record, cbs.com, August 24, 2008, archived from the original on January 4, 2010, retrieved
August 23, 2010.
24 Greenhouse, Linda, "Washington talk: High Court still groping to define due process" , The New York Times, (May
31, 1990), retrieved August 23, 2014.
25 Scalia, "The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules," 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
26 Greenhouse (1990).
27 Rossum, Ralph, The textualist jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, Claremont McKenna College, archived from the
original on January 25, 2010, retrieved August 23, 2014.
28 D'Andrea, The Social Role Identity of Italian American Women: An Analysis and Comparison of Familial and
Religious Expectations, in THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS 61 (R.N. Juliani
ed. 1983)
29 Thomas L. Shaffer Mary, Character and Community: Rispetto As A Virtue in the Tradition of Italian -American
Lawyers, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 838, 843 (1989)
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Further, the Shaffer’s determined that this shift was possibly due to the concept of rispetto.
Rispetto is the way to “acknowledge publicly one’s position…and thereby to incur a set of
obligations.”

30

Incurring obligations, though, is a position that is within and from the family,

thereby creating obligations for the family. However, modern Italian-Americans have shifted their
focus from primarily on the family, to the immediate community and finally through the
contributions of a group to the host culture.

Specific characteristics that support this notion

include:
(1) a sense of place (paese), an inheritance from the generation of immigrants who
expanded the protection of the family to include fellow villagers (paesani);
(2) independence, the desire and skill to act on one's own “and in the event of a real
need for help [to go] to one's family”';
(3) courage — seggendo in piume in fama non si vien ne sotto coltre (fame does
not come to one who lies on feathers under a blanket);
(4) self-respect—fare bella figura—which necessarily includes respect in and for
the family; and
(5) respect for the place of the outsider, when one is in the outsider's place, so that
one does not flaunt one's own ways in the presence of strangers. 31
Equally as important as family to Italian-American culture, is a penchant for a strict set of
rules to be followed, leading to a strong sense of cohesiveness in the family structure.

32

Structure

in Italian-American families is largely authoritarian; freedom for the children is not encouraged or

30

Id. at 844, citing Notarianni & Raspa, The Italian Community of Helper, Utah: Its Historic and Folkloric Past and
Present, in THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS, supra note 23 at 31.
31 Id. at 845, citing Viscusi, Il Caso della Casa: Stories of Houses in Italian America, in THE FAMILY AND
COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS, supra note 23 at 115-116
32 Peter A. Lauricella, Chi Lascia La Via Vecchia Per La Nuova Sa Quel Che Perde E Non Sa Quel Che Trova: The
Italian-American Experience and Its Influence on the Judicial Philosophies of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Joseph
Bellacosa, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1701, 1706 (1997)
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permitted by the parents.
family.

34

33

This resulted in strict discipline and a delayed independence from

Accordingly:

…there were rules Italian-American children were to follow, no questions asked,
which gave them a strong sense of right and wrong. This rule-oriented upbringing
led Italian-American scholar John Horace Mariano to conclude that two resultant
characteristics of Italian-Americans are “[s] traightforwardness and honest dealing”
and “[s]ubmission to the majesty of the law.” 35
The “rules” mentioned above aren’t necessarily the law of the United States; there has long been
a history of organized crime within Italian-American culture. However, the “mafia” has their own
code: Omerta. Omerta is the code of silence that all Mafioso undertake.

36

Specifically, omerta

refers to the “categorical prohibition of cooperation with state authorities or reliance on its services,
even when one has been a victim of a crime.”

37

Further, according to omerta, Mafioso should

avoid interfering in the business of others and should not inform the authorities of a crime under
any circumstances. The mafia follows this code uniformly; deviation is punishable by death.

38

Although the mafia’s rules (omerta) are not legal by any means, the Italian-American mafia still
follows their code or set of rules, much like all Italian-Americans. The code is strict and deviation
is not acceptable.
This paper seeks to establish that Justice Scalia’s originalist and textualist beliefs are a
result of his Italian-American upbringing. Two main theories permeate through Justice Scalia’s
decision-making and opinion writing; the strong sense of family and a strict sense of obedience to

33

Id. at 1707, citing Andrew Rolle, The Italian-Americans: Troubled Roots (1980) at 114.
Id., citing Colleen Leahy Johnson, Growing Up and Growing Old in Italian -American Families (1985) at 183
35 Id., citing John Horace Mariano, The Italian Contribution to American Democracy 239 (1975)
36 Cutrera, Antonio La mafia e i mafiosi, Reber, Palermo: 1900, p. 27 (reprinted by Arnaldo Forni Editore, Sala
Bolognese 1984, quoted in Nelli, The Business of Crime, p. 13-14.
37 Paoli, Letizia, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style (Studies in Crime and Public Policy) . Oxford
University Press, New York. 2003.
38 Id.
34
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a set of rules or code. 39 The section that follows analyzes ten (10) of Justice Scalia’s opinions

40

and proffers a theory on how Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage and upbringing influe nced
each decision.
III.

CASE STUDIES
A.

Roper v. Simmons

41

The Defendant, Christopher Simmons, plotted a murder with two young men when he was
seventeen (17) years old. One of the individuals eventually backed out of the plan. Nonetheless,
Simmons and an accomplice broke into the victim’s home by reaching though an open window
and unlocking the door. When the victim awakened and wandered into the hallway, Simmons
immediately recognized her from a previous car accident involving the both of them.

The

perpetrators bound the victim with electrical wire and wrapped her entire face in duct tape. From
there, the perpetrators forced her into a vehicle, drove her to a state park

42

and threw her off a

bridge, drowning the victim.
When the case was brought to trial, the evidence to convict Simmons was overwhelming.
Not only had Simmons confessed to the police, but he also performed a video reenactment of the
crime. Additionally, there was testimony from Simmons’ accomplice that implied that the murder
was premeditated. After trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for Simmons

43

and recommended

a death sentence, which was accepted by the court. Immediately, Simmons appealed the case,
initially arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

44

since his trial attorney did not

A host of sub-factors related to the main theories opined above include: A sense of place or comfort in one’s place,
courage, self-respect, respect for others, a limitation on freedoms, and straightforwardness.
40 A blend of majority, concurring and dissenting opinions.
41 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
42 Id. at 556.
43 Id. at 557
44 Id. at 558
39

9

raise his age, impulsiveness and troubled background as potential mitigating factors. The trial
court rejected Simmons’ motion, which Simmons appealed.
As Simmons appealed his sentence, the Supreme Court ruled on Atkins v. Virginia

45 ,

holding that the mentally retarded could not be executed. Simmons thereafter filed a new petition
for post conviction relief and the Supreme Court of Missouri followed Atkins 46 and Simmons was
then sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

47

The State of Missouri appealed the

Missouri Supreme Court’s decision to the United States Supreme Court.
In writing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter,
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer, began his analysis by examining a number of cases decided
in the past determining the validity of capital punishment for those under the age of eighteen (18).48
In 1988, the Court decided Thompson v. Oklahoma 49 , which barred the execution of crimina l
offenders under the age of sixteen (16). 50 Further, in 1989, the Court upheld capital punishme nt
for offenders sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years old when they committed capital offenses.

51

However, in 2005, using the “evolving standards of decency” test, the Court held that it was cruel
and unusual punishment to execute an offender who was under the age of eighteen (18) at the time
of the murder. The majority cited numerous sociological and scientific studies that concluded
juveniles have a lack a maturity and responsibility compared to their adult counterparts.

45

52

Further,

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 559 .
47 Atkins overturned the death penalty for the mentally retarted. According to the Supreme Court of Missouri, “a
national consensus has developed against the execution of the mentally ill” and as such, the execution of the mentally
ill was deemed to violate the Eighth Amendment. Taking this decision into consideration, the Supreme Court of
Missouri sentenced Simmons to life imprisonment, as opposed to death. While Simmons was not mentally retarted,
the court may have compared the capability of understanding crime at his age to those that are mentally retarted. See
Katcsh, M. Ethan, Taking Sides. Clashing Views on Legal Issues (13th Ed.), Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education,
p. 247 (2008).
48 Id. at 560
49 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
50 Id. at 561
51 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
52 542 U.S. at 564-569
46

10

teenagers were found to be the most overrepresented group in many categories of reckless
behavior. The Court also acknowledged that almost every state prohibited those under eighteen
(18) from serving on juries, voting, or marrying without parental consent.

53

The Court also noted that there was an increasing frequency in which states were choosing
not to execute juvenile offenders. At that time, twenty (20) states had the legal authority to execute
juvenile offenders. However, only six (6) states had actually executed juveniles since 1989 and
only three (3) of those doing so in the previous ten (10) years. Moreover, five (5) of the states
which allowed the child death penalty in 1989 had since abolished it. The Court also looked to
contemporary practice in the international community. Between 1990 and the time of the decision,
only seven (7) countries other than the United States has executed juvenile offenders.

Those

countries included Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and China.

The majority further noted that since 1990, each and every one of those

countries had either abolished the practice of executing juvenile offenders or had made a public
disavowal of the practice. Finally, the Court noted that only the United States and Somalia had
not ratified Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
expressly prohibits capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles.

54

Ultimately, the Court

held that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the execution of
individuals under the age of eighteen (18).

55

In concurrence, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, pointed out that the most
important part of the decision was the reaffirmation of the basic principle of interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

53

Id.
Id. at 570-578
55 Id. at 579
56 Id. at 587.
54
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56

According to Justice Stevens, “If the

meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would impose no
impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today.”

57

Justice O’Connor dissented, criticizing the Missouri Supreme Court for failing to follow
the precedent established by Stanford. While Justice O’Connor agreed that the evidence presented
in the immediate matter was similar to the evidence in Atkins, she contended that at least eight (8)
states adopted legislation that permitted the execution of sixteen (16) and seventeen (17) year-old
offenders.

58

Further, Justice O’Connor argued that the difference in maturity between adults and

juveniles was not significant enough to justify excluding juveniles from the death penalty.

59

Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in this case. The over-arching theme of Justice
Scalia’s dissent was that the appropriate question was not whether there was a national consensus
against the execution of juveniles; rather, whether the execution of the defendants was considered
cruel and unusual at the time at which the Bill of Rights was ratified. In addition, Justice Scalia
also objected to the Court comparing American law to international norms. Justice Scalia took
particular issue with the Court’s willingness to “invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own
thinking, and ignore it otherwise.” This statement was made in respect to abortion laws in the
United States being less restrictive than the rest of the world and the Court’s reliance on Englis h
law, which did not possess the same double jeopardy law the United States had. Further, Justice
Scalia felt the majority was acting outside of the Supreme Court’s designated power, in that, the
Supreme Court was essentially interpreting the law of what it should say rather than what the law
actually says.

60

57

Id.
Id. at 597-599.
59 Id. at 598-607.
60 Id. at 607-630
58

12

In this case, Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage permeates his criticism of the
Supreme Court usurping the legislature’s power in determining what the law should say, rather
than viewing and interpreting what the law actually says. In this way, Justice Scalia is adhering to
a strict set of rules rampant in Italian-American culture. Justice Scalia specifically noted the line
of the Court’s power and how they crossed into another branch of government’s power, i.e.,
breaking the separation of powers “rule.” Further, Justice Scalia chastised the majority for not
taking into consideration that the Missouri Supreme Court flatly ignored the Court’s precedent set
forth in Stanford. 61 Justice Scalia, in this point, states his disdain for the Missouri Supreme Court
for going against the Court as Justice Scalia points out "it is this Court's prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents."

62

This frustration can be attributed to Justice Scalia’s desire for a

strict following of rules.
In this opinion, Justice Scalia seems to have no sympathy for those who commit heinous
offenses, even when under the age of eighteen (18). Justice Scalia’s wish to rely on precedent over
the empirical data the majority cited not only demonstrates his need for a strict set of rules; it also
may demonstrate that Justice Scalia fits within the mold of Italian-Americans demanding a strong
sense of right and wrong from children. While the majority cites data and international precedent
in an effort to “protect” the minor, Justice Scalia finds the data (and the minor’s age) irreleva nt.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s disgust with the majority’s reliance on international law/custom could be
attributed to the emphasis on independence formed in Italian-Americans.
B.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

63

61

Id. at 628-629
Id. at 629, citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (2001)
63 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
62

13

In this case, the petitioner and several other teenagers made a cross out of broken chair legs
and tape. Once the cross was assembled, the youths placed the cross in the front yard of an AfricanAmerican family and set it on fire. The petitioner was charged with a violation of the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property, a symbol, object, appellatio n,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 64
The petitioner argued that the statute was facially invalid under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution and moved to dismiss the count on the ground that it was substantia lly
overbroad and impermissibly content based.

The trial court granted the motion, however, the

Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minnesota Court had construed the phrase
“arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others”
the Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire

66

65

to conduct that amounted to fighting words under

case. Furthermore, the Minnesota Court concluded that the

ordinance was not impermissible because "the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means towards
accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against biasmotivated threats to public safety and order."

67

The petitioner sought certiorari, which the

Supreme Court granted.

64

Id. at 379
Id. at 380
66 315 U.S. 568 (1942). This opinion held:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those, which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any expositio n of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
67 In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)
65

14

In writing the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Souter and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia noted that petitioner’s conduct could have been
prosecuted under a variety of Minnesota statutes.

68

Justice Scalia also stated that the Supreme

Court was bound by the conclusion that the ordinance at issue only reached expressions of
“fighting words” under Chaplinsky.

69

The petitioner contended that the Chaplinsky standard

should be narrowed; therefore the ordinance would be invalid as substantially overbroad.
However, the Court concluded that even if the offense amounted to “fighting words” under
Chaplinsky, the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face in that it prohibited permitted speech
solely on the basis of the subject the speech addressed. The Court reached this conclusion after a
careful and thought-provoking analysis.

70

First, the Court began its analysis with a review of free speech principles, beginning with
the rule that the First Amendment prevents the government from proscribing speech because of
the ideas expressed.

71

However, the Court noted that in a limited number of circumstance s,

society has permitted restrictions on the content of speech when there is “…such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”

72

The Court then clarified previous free speech cases, stating that

some areas of free speech:
…can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) — not that they
are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be
made the vehicles for content discrimination. 73

68

505 U.S. at 379-380, N.1
Id. at 380
70 Id. at 381
71 Id. at 382
72 Id. at 382-383, citing Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572
73 Id. at 383-384
69

15

Therefore, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, the government could "proscribe libel, but it may not make
the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government."

74

Further, Justice Scalia explained that while an utterance of speech may be allowable on the
basis of one feature, the Constitution could very well prohibit it on the basis of another feature.
For example, burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishab le,
but burning a flag in violation of an ordinance dishonoring that flag is not.

75

Additionally, other

reasonable time or place restrictions could be upheld, but only if those restrictions were “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”

76

The Court then analyzed two final principles of free speech. One describes that when "the
entire basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of
speech is proscribable, no significant danger of viewpoint discrimination exists."

77

The other

principle involves a valid basis for according treatment to certain sub-classes of speech if that
speech "happens to be associated with particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that 'the
regulation is justified without reference to the content of the … speech.'"

78

For example, the Court

noted that a State may permit obscene performances except those involving minors.

79

In applying

the principles to the city ordinance at issue, the Court found that it was unconstitutional on its face.
80

Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor, opined that the Supreme
Court of Minnesota’s judgment should have been reversed since the ordinance criminalized

74

Id. at 384
Id. at 385
76 Id. at 386, citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
77 Id. at 388
78 Id. at 389, quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
79 Id. at 389
80 Id. at 391
75
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expression protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.

81

By reaching that expressive

conduct that causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment is criminal, Justice White concluded that
the ordinance was overbroad.

82

Further, Justice White determined that the First Amendment does

not protect “fighting words” along with other particular categories of speech.

83

Finally, Justice

White concluded that if the ordinance had not been overbroad, it would have been valid as a
regulation of unprotected speech for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
clause.

84

Justice Blackmun concurred in judgment, however, Justice Blackmun concluded that the
majority’s approach would result in two consequences: (1) the decision would relax the level of
strict scrutiny applicable to content-based laws or (2) the decision would be regarded as a
manipulation of the First Amendment to strike down an ordinance whose premise the majority
opposed. 85
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White and Justice Blackmun, opined that the ordinance
was overbroad.

86

However, Justice Stevens determined that the majority was incorrect in ruling

that proscribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject matter.

87

Further, Justice Stevens

criticized the majority for giving “fighting words” and obscenities the same protection afforded to
political speech.

88

Finally, Justice Stevens concluded that not all content-based distinctions are

uniform and presumptively invalid.

89

81

Id. at 397-416.
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 415-416
86 Id. 416-436.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
82

17

In this case, Justice Scalia’s Italian-American characteristics are not in the forefront of the
opinion as in the previous case. However, the two characteristics that could have contributed to
Justice Scalia’s decision in this matter are a limitation on freedoms and respect for others
property/family. In the first point of analysis, Justice Scalia acknowledged a limited number of
circumstances where an individual’s right to freedom of speech can be limited.

90

This is an

obvious nod to a willingness to restrict freedom. In the Court’s second point of analysis, Justice
Scalia stated that the Constitution can limit and permit freedom of speech on a similar subject.

91

In his final points of analysis, Justice Scalia touches on the respect for others factor. Specifica lly,
Justice Scalia noted that when subclasses of speech have a secondary effect, the regulation could
be justified.

92

In this case, the sensitive nature of the facts could certainly be considered under

this analysis.
C.

Lee v. Weisman

93

In this case, Petitioner Robert E. Lee, the principal of a middle school in Providence, Rhode
Island, invited a Jewish rabbi to lead a prayer at the school’s graduation ceremony.

94

The parents

of a student, Deborah Weisman, requested an injunction to bar the rabbi from speaking at the
ceremony. The school district denied the family’s request.

95

After the graduation ceremony, the

family proceeded with litigation and won in the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The school district,
on behalf of Lee, filed a writ of certiorari United States Supreme Court.

96

The school district

argued that the prayer was non-denominational and was voluntary, as Deborah did not have to
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Id. at 382-383, citing Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572
Id. at 385
92 Id. at 389, quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
93 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
94 Id. at 581-584
95 Id. at 584
96 Id. at 585.
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stand during the prayer. Further, the school board argued that Deborah and Deborah’s family did
not have to attend the ceremony at all.

97

The majority found in favor of the family in a 5-4 decision. Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Souter, authored the majority
opinion, which found that Lee’s decision to give the rabbi the forum to conduct a public prayer for
a civic occasion was wrongful:
Through these means, the principal directed and controlled the content of the
prayers…It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprude nce
that it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on
by government, and that is what the school officials attempted to do. 98
Further, the majority noted that the non-denominational nature of the prayer was not a valid
defense, since the Establishment Clause forbids coerced prayers in public school. The coerced
prayer does not have to be of one religious sect to be prohibited.

99

Moreover, the majority

dismissed the notion that the graduation ceremony was voluntary as extreme, since graduation is
one of life’s most significant occasions and absence of the ceremony would “require forfeiture of
those intangible benefits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high schoo l
years.”

100

In answering the school district’s contention that the prayer itself was voluntary, Justice

Kennedy formulated the coercion test, holding:
The school district's supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony
places subtle and indirect public and peer pressure on attending students to stand as
a group or maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. A
reasonable dissenter of high school age could believe that standing or remaining
silent signified her own participation in, or approval of, the group exercise, rather
than her respect for it. And the State may not place the student dissenter in the
dilemma of participating or protesting. Since adolescents are often susceptible to
peer pressure, especially in matters of social convention, the State may no more use
97

Id. at 587-589
Id. at 588
99 Id. at 621-626
100 Id. at 595
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social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use direct means. The
embarrassment and intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing
that the prayers are of a de minimis character, since that is an affront to the rabbi
and those for whom the prayers have meaning, and since any intrusion was both
real and a violation of the objectors' rights. 101
Justice Kennedy further stated that the Constitution of the United States guarantees that the
government “may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”
102

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, concurred with the
majority’s holding.

Justice Blackmun concluded that the Establishment of Religion Clause

prohibits government endorsement of religion and the government’s active involvement in
religion.

103

Justice Blackmun found this conclusion despite the fact that government coercion is

sufficient to prove a violation of the clause.

104

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor, expressed that the cause
bars a state from endorsing generically Theistic prayers when the state could not sponsor
denominational prayers in his concurrence.

105

Moreover, government sponsorship of prayer at

graduation ceremonies is reasonably understood as an unconstitutional endorsement of religio n.
In this case specifically, the government endorsement rose to support of Theistic religion.

106

Finally, Justice Souter opined that a showing of coercion is not necessary to a successful claim of
a violation of the Establishment of Religion Clause.

101

Id. at 577, Syllabus, citing Id. at 590-594
Id. at 587
103 Id. at 599-609.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 609-631.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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107

In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued against the adoption
of the coercion test. Justice Scalia believed that the majority’s holding “lays waste a tradition that
is as old as public school graduation themselves, and that is a component of an even more
longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally. ”
108

Scalia pointed to historical examples of calling on divine guidance by former Presidents,

including President Washington’s proclamation of Thanksgiving in 1789.

109

Further, Scalia

disputed the Court’s holding that attendance at graduation ceremonies were required as social
norms and the conclusion that students were subtly coerced to stand for the prayer. In his view,
only “official” penalties for refusing to support a religion resulted in an Establishment Clause
violation.

110

The main indicator of Justice Scalia’s Italian-American heritage in this case is his
adherence to a strict set of rules. Specifically, Justice Scalia mentions that only “offic ial” penalties
violated the Establishment Clause.

111

In that sense, Justice Scalia essentially states that only an

explicit refusal to support a religion arises to a Constitutional violation.

112

Further, Justice Scalia

refused to acknowledge that the school had implicit control over the attendance of the high school
graduation.

113

In this way, Justice Scalia also followed his strict code, as he only would

acknowledge an explicit control over attendance as opposed to implicit control.
D.

Edwards v. Aguillard

114

108

Id. at 632
Id. at 633-636
110 Id. at 636-646
111 Id.
112 An example of such a violation would be a public school graduation refusing to allow a Jewish prayer.
113 Id.
114 482 U.S. 578 (1987)
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In the early 1980’s, numerous states attempted to introduce the teaching of creationism

115

along with the teaching of evolution in schools. Louisiana instituted a law that did not require
teaching of creationism or evolution; but the law did require that if evolution was taught,
creationism must be taught as well.

116

The District Court ruled against Louisiana, with the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the decision. Both courts found that the motive in passing the
statute was to promote creationism.

117

The majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, Justice
Blackmun, Justice Powell and Justice Stevens, ruled the law unconstitutional as an infringe me nt
on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority’s basis for this conclusion was
an analysis under the Lemon 118 test, which is comprised of three steps: (1) The government’s
action must have a legitimate secular purpose, (2) the government’s action must not have the
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) the government’s action must not
result in an “excessive entanglement” of the government and religion.

119

Based upon this premise,

the majority held the law facially invalid since it lacked a clear, secular purpose.

120

The Court

found that the law did not further its stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” and the law
impermissibly endorsed religion by advancing creationism. Further, the law gave teachers no
freedom they did not already possess and limited their ability to decide what academic princip les
should be taught.121
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred, concluding that the language of the
statute and the statute’s history confirmed the intent of the Louisiana legislature to promote a

Creationism is the belief that the universe and living organisms originate “from specific acts of divine creation.”
Id.
117 Id. at 582.
118 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
119 Edwards 482 U.S. at 583, citing Lemon 403 U.S. at 612-613.
120 Id. at 585.
121 Id. at 586-594
115
116
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specific religious belief.

122

Further, Justice Powell wrote that the nothing in the majority opinion

limited the broad discretion state and local school officials traditionally enjoyed, regarding the
selection of public school curriculum.

123

In conclusion, Justice Powell held that under a challenge

of the Establishment Clause, interference with the decisions of school boards is only warranted
when the intended purpose behind a decision is obviously religious.

124

Justice White also concurred with judgment of the majority. In his opinion, Justice White
wrote that even if a different conclusion regarding the purpose of the statute could be ascertained
by a plain reading of the statute, the lower courts were not so obviously wrong in their decision
that they should be reversed.

125

In his dissent, with Chief Justice Rehnquist joining, Justice Scalia accepted the state’s
stated purpose of “protecting academic freedom” as sincere. He construed the term “academic
freedom” to refer to "students' freedom from indoctrination"

126

; in this case their freedom "to

decide for themselves how life began, based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific
evidence."

127

Further, Justice Scalia scrutinized the first portion of the Lemon test, stating "To

look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist."

128

Justice Scalia’s Italian-American factor in this case is harder to decipher than most.
However, its possible that Justice Scalia considered the sense of place/comfort in one’s place is
the motivator here. Justice Scalia stated that school children are free for themselves to decide how

122

Id. at 597-608.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 608-610.
126 Id. at 627
127 Id.
128 Id. at 637
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life began.

129

He therefore, wishes to allow children to be comfortable in their decision.

Moreover, this decision may also point to Justice Scalia’s willingness to keep this type of material
in the family structure. It is possible that Justice Scalia’s parents instilled his creationist views in
him.

This could be an instance of Justice Scalia wanting a strong, family structure to foster

children’s beliefs.
E.

Gonzales v. Raich 130
In 1996, California passed Proposition 215, which legalized the use of medical marijua na.

131

The Defendant, Angel Raich, used his own homegrown medical marihuana, which was

acceptable under California law, but was illegal under federal law. The plants were considered
Schedule I drugs under the federal Controlled Substance Act.

132

On August 15, 2002, the Drug

Enforcement Agency and officers of the Butte County Sheriff’s Department destroyed all of codefendant Diane Monson’s marijuana plants, even though they determined that her possession was
entirely legal under California state law.

133

Both Monson and Raich sought injunctive and

declaratory relief, claiming that enforcing the CSA would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

134

Both Raich and Monson were treated by physicians, who determined, after prescribing
numerous prescription medications, that medicinal marijuana would be the only “medicatio n”
available to alleviate their symptoms. Both women used marijuana medicinally for years prior to
their doctors’ recommendations. Further, evidence suggested that both women heavily relied on
marijuana to function daily. In the case of Raich, her physician believed that if Raich stopped

129

Id. at 627
545 U.S. 1 (2005)
131 Id. at 5
132 Id. at 14, citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
133 Id. at 7
134 Id at 7-15
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using marijuana, the excruciating pain she would suffer from could turn fatal.
Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

136

135

The District

The United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the District Court’s judgment and ordered the preliminar y
injunction, finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a strong likelihood that the CSA exceeded
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.

137

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer, wrote the majority opinion.

The decision was a 6-3 ruling, first pointing out that the

defendants never disputed that Congress had the power to control the non-medical uses of
marijuana.

Further, the defendants did not dispute the passage of the CSA as illegal under the

Commerce Power. The Court noted that all the defendants argue is that the CSA’s “prohibition of
the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and
possession of marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause.”
in Wickard v. Filburn,

139

138

However, the Court reasoned that based on the rulings

United States v. Lopez, 140 and United States v. Morrison,

141 :

…the regulation is squarely within Congress' commerce power because production
of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a
substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.
142

135

Id. at 7
Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
137 Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1243 (9th Cir. 2003)
138 Id. at 15
139 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
140 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
141 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
142 Gonzales 545 U.S. at 19
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Further, the difficulty in distinguishing marijuana that is grown locally or elsewhere led the Court
to have no difficulty in believing that Congress had a rational basis for believing that intrastate
possession of marijuana would leave a hole in the CSA. 143
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in this case in an effort to differentiate the
decision from those in Lopez and Morrison. Although Justice Scalia voted in favor of limiting the
Commerce Clause in the previous cases, he felt that his reading of the Necessary and Property
Clause forced him to vote for the expansion of the Commerce Clause in this case:
Unlike the power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, the power to enact laws enabling effective regulation of interstate
commerce can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an
interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to make the
interstate regulation effective. As Lopez itself states, and the Court affirms today,
Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to
do so ‘could … undercut’ its regulation of interstate commerce. ... This is not a
power that threatens to obliterate the line between ‘what is truly national and what
is truly local.’ 144
Further, Justice Scalia pointed out that both Lopez and Morrison did not declare that noneconomic
intrastate activities were beyond the scope of the Federal Government’s regulation.

145

Finally,

Justice Scalia states that Congress’ ability to enact prohibitions of intrastate controlled substance
activities depend only upon whether the regulations are an appropriate means of achieving the
legitimate ends of eradicating “Schedule I” substance from interstate commerce.

146

Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented,
expressing that the majority decision allowed an application of the CSA that destroyed California’s
position without any proof that the medicinal possession and use of marijuana had a substantia l
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Id. at 22
Id. at 38
145 Id.
146 Id. at 40
144
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effect on interstate commerce.

147

Further, in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Court essentially

promulgated a rule that gave Congress an incentive to legislate broadly under the Commerce
Clause.

148

Accordingly, Justice O’Connor wrote that the position the majority allowed was

irreconcilable with the prior Supreme Court decisions.

149

Justice Thomas also dissented, stating that the local cultivation and consumption of
medicinal marijuana by the two patients was not commerce amongst the states.

150

Further, Justice

Thomas held that the CSA as applied in the case was not necessary and proper in upholding
Congress’ restrictions on interstate drug trade.

151

Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, neither

the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to regulate
the conduct at issue.

152

Justice Scalia’s opinion in this case could be derived from his need for a strict sense of
rules. Here, Justice Scalia read the Necessary and Proper Cause in a narrow fashion, holding that
“Congress may regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so ‘could
… undercut’ its regulation of interstate commerce.”

153

In a narrow reading of this clause, Justice

Scalia is exhibiting his desire for a strict set of rules with limited exception. Possibly, if Justice
Scalia had a different upbringing rather than the traditional Italian-American family he grew up
in, he would be more open to exceptions or a broader reading of Constitutional provisions.

F.

Michael H. v. Gerald D.154

147

Id. at 42-57.
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 58-74.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 38
154 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
148
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In 1981, Gerald D. was listed as the father on the birth certificate of Victoria D.

155

Victoria

D.’s mother, Carole D., believed, however, that the real father of Victoria D. was Michael H., a
man with whom she had been having an affair. A paternity test revealed a substantial likelihood
that Michael H. was indeed the father of Victoria D. 156 Michael H. thereafter filed an action in
California to attain visitation rights and to be established as Victoria D.’s father.

157

Gerald D.,

however, petitioned for summary judgment under California Evidence Code § 621, which states
“the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusive ly
presumed to be a child of the marriage.”

158

The California Supreme Court agreed with Gerald D.,

but Michael H. was granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Michael H. claimed
that § 621 violated substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

159

In writing the plurality opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, opined that § 621 did not violate due process rights and therefore
Michael H. could not rebut California’s evidentiary presumption that Gerald D. was Victoria’s
father. Justice Scalia was open with his disgust of the facts of the case with comments such as
“[t]he facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary”
itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”

161

160

and “California law, like nature

To establish the scope of the Due Process

Clause, Justice Scalia wrote that the interest in limitation must be so fundamental that it is an
interest that is traditionally protected by society.

162

The tradition that was to be rebutted in this

case, is the traditional marital family structure and the presumption of legitimacy of children that
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Id. at 113
Id. at 114
157 Id.
158 Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (Deering 1986)
159 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116
160 Id. at 113
161 Id. at 118
162 Id. at 122
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was rooted in common law.

163

Therefore, Michael H. had to prove that society afforded natural

fathers parental rights; or at least, society did not outright deny them when there is a child born
into a traditional family. The Court found that the states did not award substantive parental rights
to the natural father where a child was born into an existing family.

164

Ultimately, Justice Scalia

found “to provide protection to an adulterous father is to deny protection to a marital father, and
vice versa.”

165

Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, concurred with Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion, except that none of the modes of historical analysis expressed by the plurality should be
imposed when analyzing due process liberty interests.

166

Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment. According to Justice Stevens, the statute
at issue did not violate due process since it prevented the putative father from obtaining the
judiciary’s determination of the paternity.

167

Further, Justice Stevens opined that the possibility

of a constitutionally protected relationship between a natural father and child should not be
foreclosed in light of the decision in this case.

168

Finally, in assuming the putative father’s

relationship with the adolescent was strong enough to allow a constitutional right for visitatio n,
California’s legislative scheme was consistent with due process.

169

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun, dissented, expressing
that natural father’s link to his child, combined with a parent-child relationship between them,
guarantees the natural father an interest in his relationship with his child.

163
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170

Further, Justice

Brennan found that the statute at issue prevented the putative father from establishing his paternity,
but also prevented him from obtaining visitation rights.

171

This system, according to Justice

Brennan, breeds a flaw that procedural due process is designed to correct.

172

Justice White also dissented, opining that an unwed father who has demonstrated a
commitment to his paternity through personal, financial or custodial responsibilities, has a
protected interest in a relationship with the child.

173

In the immediate instance, Justice White

found that the putative father did have such an interest and that the statute violated his due process
rights because the putative father was denied any meaningful opportunity to establish his paternity.
174

This case is, arguably, Justice Scalia’s most obvious and outspoken view on how a family
should operate and be structured. First, Justice Scalia found that Michael H. was looking to:
embrace[s] the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child,
including the child's care; the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the control,
education, and health of the child; and the right, as well as the duty, to prepare the
child for additional obligations, which includes the teaching of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.175
Further, Justice Scalia found that if the concept of family that Michael H was trying to establish
was accepted, “…it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships…”

176

Justice

Scalia also mocked the dissent’s idea that Michael H. had a “freedom not to conform,” by stating
“[o]ne of them will pay a price for asserting that ‘freedom’—Michael by being unable to act as a
father of the child he has adulterously begotten, or Gerald by being unable to preserve the integr ity

171

Id.
Id.
173 Id. at 157-163.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 118-119
176 Id. at 123 n. 3
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of the traditional family unit he and victoria have established.”

177

These theories clearly fall

within the traditional Italian-American ideals of the sanctity of the family structure cited in Part II.
G.

Cruz v. New York

178

Jerry Cruz was murdered in March of 1982. The day after Jerry Cruz was murdered, the
police spoke to Jerry Cruz’s brother, Norberto Cruz, about the murder. While Norberto Cruz knew
nothing of his brother’s murder, Norberto Cruz told the police that one-year prior, Eulogio Cruz
and Benjamin Cruz visited Jerry Cruz and Norberto Cruz (Eulogio and Benjamin were brothers,
however, the pair bore no familial relation with Jerry and Norberto). Norberto Cruz told police
that during this visit, Eulogio Cruz wore a bloodstained bandage around his arm. Further, Norberto
Cruz told police that Eulogio Cruz stated that he and Benjamin Cruz had intended to rob a gas
station in the Bronx, the attendant struggled and shot Eulogio Cruz in the arm. Benjamin Cruz
then shot the attendant, killing him.

179

The police found Benjamin Cruz and questioned him about the murder of Jerry Cruz. He
denied being involved in that crime and became increasingly frustrated when the police seemed to
be unwilling to believe him. In an apparent effort to prove he would admit to an act he was guilty
of, Benjamin Cruz confessed to the murder of the gas station attendant. After an Assistant Distric t
Attorney was brought to the police station, Benjamin Cruz gave a detailed videotape confession,
during which he admitted that he, Eulogio Cruz, Jerry Cruz and a fourth man had robbed the
station.

180

A grand jury indicted Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz for felony murder. The brothers were
tried jointly.

Euologio objected to the use of Jerry’s videotaped confession, however it was
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481 U.S. 186 (1986)
179 Id. at 188
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admitted with a limiting instruction that it could only be used against Jerry. The jury found both
men guilty and Euologio was subject to a sentence of fifteen years to life. Euologio appealed, but
the appellate division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

181

In writing the majority opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall,
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens, discussed Bruton v. United States 182 in analyzing the
question presented. In Bruton, the Court held that a defendant is deprived of rights under the
Confrontation Clause if a confession by his codefendant is introduced at the joint trial. Moreover,
the Court held that it was of no significance if the jury received a limiting instruction to consider
it only in the confessor’s case.

183

Justice Scalia then moved on to discuss how the Confrontatio n

Clause works. This clause guarantees that defendants can confront the witnesses that testify
against them. This guarantee includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. In a joint trial, Scalia
stated, the confession of one defendant is not admissible against the codefendant unless the
confessing defendant waives his rights under the Fifth Amendment in order to submit to crossexamination.

184

In Burton, the Court determined that limiting instructions to the jury were

insufficient in this regard. The Court was split on a subsequent case where both defendants made
confessions.

In his concurrence in Parker v. Randolph, Justice Blackman proffered that the

introduction of corroborating confessions could cause a harmless violation of the Confrontatio n
Clause, however, there could be other cases in which the violation would be much more
detrimental.

185
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Id. at 189
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184 Id. at 189-191
185 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
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In the immediate case, the Court adopted Justice Blackmun’s view from Parker, finding
that there were plenty of statements that could cause a corroborating statement to be “devastating. ”
The Court then argues that Cruz’s confession was open to question because it depended on the
acceptance of Norberto’s testimony.

186

Further, the Court discovered an inverse relationship

when two confessions “interlock”:
A codefendant's confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it
tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but
enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's
alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his
confession, in which case it could be said that the codefendant's confession does no
more than support the defendant's very own case. But in the real world of crimina l
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession—on the ground that it
was not accurately reported, or that it was not really true when made. 187
In conclusion, Justice Scalia and the majority held that the Confrontation Clause bars the
admission, in joint trials, of non-testifying codefendants’ confessions incriminating the defendant,
even if the defendant’s own confession is admitted. If the codefendant is unavailable, Justice
Scalia found that a defendant’s confession could be considered to assess whether a codefendant’s
statements are supported by an “indicia of reliability” to be admissible against him, despite the
lack of opportunity for cross-examination.

188

Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice O’Connor,
dissented, stating that the Bruton rule should not be extended to a case where a defendant’s
confession “interlocked” with a codefendant’s confession.

189

In this matter, the codefendant’s

confession was essentially the same as the other defendant’s confession and therefore could not
incriminate either defendant any more then their own respective confessions.
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190

In finding that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of non-testifying codefendants’
confessions incriminating the defendant in joint-trials, Justice Scalia could be applying a
straightforward application of the law. Straightforwardness, as stated in Part II, is a feature of
Italian-American culture. In a plain reading of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant has the
right to face his accuser and subject him/her to cross-examination. It naturally follows that if a
codefendant does not testify at trial, there is no opportunity to cross-examine the accuser. It is a
simple, basic approach to reading the law. Similarly, this reading could allude to a strict adherence
to code common amongst Italian-Americans. Here, Justice Scalia read the law and interpreted it
for its basic meaning. Justice Scalia was unwilling to find an exception where one could be drawn.
H.

Florida v. Jaridines

191

In November of 2006, an anonymous tip was given to Miami Police that the Defendant’s
home was being used as a marijuana grow home. Approximately one month later, a few detectives
and a trained drug-sniffing canine approached the home, while other officers and the DEA
established a perimeter around the home. An officer accompanied the dog up to the front door of
the defendant’s home and the dog alerted the officer of contraband. After being informed of the
dog’s findings, a detective approached the home and smelled the scent of marijuana. The detective
then prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant. A search was conducted after the
warrant was granted and marijuana was found in the home.

192

The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence. However, the
decision was reversed in the Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
found for the defendant and denied the state a motion for rehearing.

191

133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013)
Id. at 1413
193 Id.
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The Florida Supreme Court
193

When the Supreme Court

granted certiorari, the scope was limited to the question of “whether the officers’ behavior was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

194

The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas, Justice
Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan. In the Supreme Court’s prior “dog sniff cases”,
the Court took a liberal approach to determining what did and did not constitute a search.

195

In a

5-4 decision, the court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and held that the
government’s use of dogs to investigate the home and immediate surroundings is a search. The
case was not divided along ideological lines; instead, the conservative justices were evenly split,
featuring Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined three of the four liberal justices in the major ity.
Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy joined the minority in the dissent.

196

Justice Scalia, in writing the majority, did not focus on the right to privacy, which is
generally analyzed in the modern day Fourth Amendment cases and relied upon by the concurring
justices in this case. 197 Instead, Justice Scalia focused on citizen’s property rights, returning to
the Court’s early jurisprudence. The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment’s core is comprised
of "the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."

198

Justice Scalia cited precedent as early as 1765, tying the courts

decision to common law trespass.

199

Further, Justice Scalia stated:

We therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the
home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth
194
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See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (exposure of respondent’s language to a trained canine did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
(the fact that officers walk a narcotics -detection dog around the exterior of cars does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment Search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)(a dog sniff during a lawful traffic stop reveals no
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the Fourth Amendment)
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Amendment purposes.’... That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the
distinction between the home and the open fields is ‘as old as the common law,’...
so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called the ‘curtilage or
homestall,’ for the ‘house protects and privileges all its branches and
appurtenants.’... This area around the home is ‘intimately linked to the home, both
physically and psychologically,’ and is where ‘privacy expectations are most
heightened.’ 200
Moreover, the Court stated that a doorbell or doorknocker is an invitation to the public to approach
the home for various activities, such as to “trick-or-treat” or solicit for donations.
invitation extends to the police where they have the right to ask residents for information.

201
202

This
The

Court found, however, that this implicit license does not extend to activities such as a “vis itor
exploring the front path with a metal detector”

203

house through binoculars with impunity”

and would constitute a common law trespass.

204 ,

or allowing police officers to “peer into the

Therefore, the Court found that bringing a police dog into a home’s curtilage to search for
incriminating evidence was an unreasonable search without a warrant.

205

Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, wrote a concurring
opinion. Justice Kagan took the position that both property and privacy rights are implicated in a
case such as this, stating:
A stranger comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-powered
binoculars. He doesn't knock or say hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses
the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home's furthest corners. It
doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of minutes,
his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no
one. Has your "visitor" trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have
granted to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign
flyers? Yes, he has. And has he also invaded your "reasonable expectation of
privacy" by nosing into intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure ?

200
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Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 380 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Yes, of
course, he has done that too.
That case is this case in every way that matters.

206

Justice Kagan further concluded that it does not matter whether the detection is a device or a dog;
when the device is not in general public use and is used to search a home, it violates a citize n’s
“minimal expectation of privacy.”

207

Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, stated
that the majority’s opinion is "based on a putative rule of trespass law that is nowhere to be found
in the annals of Anglo-American jurisprudence."

208

Justice Alito instead proffered that under the

traditional law of trespassing, visitors are not trespassing if they "approach the door, pause long
enough to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay longer), leave ... a visitor
who adheres to these limitations is not necessarily required to ring the doorbell, knock on the door,
or attempt to speak with an occupant."

209

In this case, Justice Scalia reverted back to citizen’s property rights, as opposed to the
reasonable expectation of privacy the courts had implemented for many years. That may be so
because traditional Italian-Americans have a sense of place or comfort in their home or
surroundings. This factor could include a sense in one’s home and surrounding area. In that case,
Justice Scalia’s holding that bringing a police dog into a home’s curtilage to search for evidence
without a warrant rises to a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search consistent with traditiona l
Italian-American beliefs.
I.

United States v. Jones 210

206

Id. at 1418.
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208 Id. at 1420.
209 Id. at 1423.
210 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
207
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Antoine Jones owned a nightclub in the Washington D.C. area, which was managed by
Lawrence Maynard. In 2004, the FBI and DC Police Department began an investigation into the
two individuals for possession and distribution of narcotics.

Without a warrant, a global

positioning system (GPS) was placed on Jones’ vehicle. The GPS tracked Jones movement for
twenty-four hors a day over the course of four weeks. In late 2005, Jones was arrested and his
attorney immediately filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the GPS. In late 2006,
a federal jury deadlocked on conspiracy charges and acquitted Jones on various other charges.
Jones was retried in 2007 and the jury found him guilty on conspiracy charges and possession. 211
The charges were significant enough for Jones to be sentenced to life in prison.

212

In 2010, the

DC Appeals Court overturned the conviction, holding that the installation of the GPS was a search
because it violated Jones’ “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In 2011, the Supreme Court grand
certiorari.

213

Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, Justice Thomas and Justice Sotomayor.

The Court held that the “Governme nt’s

installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements, constitutes a ‘search’ under the Fourth Amendment.”

214

In authoring the majority

opinion, Justice Scalia cited cases as far back as 1886 215 , arguing that a physical intrusion into a
protected area was the basis for determining whether a search occurred under the Fourth
Amendment. Scalia ceded that the majority of search and seizure cases since 1967 had shifted
toward the “reasonable expectation of privacy” approach 216 , however, Scalia pointed to a few
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decisions post-1967 to argue that the “trespass” approach had not been completely abandoned.

217

Moreover, Justice Scalia stated that at a minimum, the Fourth Amendment must provide the same
level of protection as it was intended when the Amendment was adopted.

218

Further, Scalia

emphasized that the “trespass” approach does not necessarily exclude the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” approach, since the “reasonable expectation” test is appropriate for situations where
there is a transmission of electronic signals without a trespass.

219

In the matter before the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that since the Government’s GPS
was a trespass for the sole purpose of obtaining information, it constituted a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Since the Court determined the GPS installation was considered a search,
Justice Scalia refused to recognize any exceptions that would make the search reasonable, since
the Government failed to submit an alternate theory in the lower courts.

220

The Court also left

unanswered a broader question regarding the privacy implication of warrantless GPS installa t io n
absent a physical intrusion: “It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case
does not require us to answer that question.”

221

In her concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor disputed the constitutionality of warrantless
GPS surveillance in the short as well as the long-term. Even during short-term GPS surveilla nce,
Justice Sotomayor, the GPS can record every movement of the subject and thus, private
destinations.

222

Further, Justice Sotomayor opined:

People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers, the URLS that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
217
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correspond to their Internet service providers, and the books, groceries and
medications they purchase to online retailers . . . I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection. 223
Justice Alito also concurred, with Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan
joining.

According to Justice Alito, common-law property-based analysis of searches does not

apply to electronic searches at issue in the immediate case.

224

Further, Justice Alito argued that

society’s expectation is that complete and long-term surveillance would not be undertaken.

225

Justice Scalia’s adherence to a set of rules can be seen throughout this opinion.
Specifically, Justice Scalia focuses on a substantial number of historical decisions. Further, in
analyzing the case, Justice Scalia points to decisions that hold the opposite of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test that had dominated the privacy cases since 1967. Justice Scalia
focuses on this historical approach because of his adherence to a code. Justice Scalia refused to
deter from his belief and approach in a showing of independence from the prevalent view at the
time of the opinion.
J.

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association 226

In 2005, the California Legislature passed AB 1179, which banned the sale of “viole nt ”
video games to anyone under the age of eighteen (18). 227 Further, the act required that there be
a clear labeling of the game being violent, beyond the already mandatory ESRB rating system.
The law required a maximum $1,000 fine for each infraction of the Act.

223

229

228

“Violent video games”
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228 ESRB stands for the Entertainment Software Rating Board, which was established by the United States in 1994.
The ESRB is a voluntary body that examines the content of video games before they are distributed and gives a ra ting
on its content. Sellers of video games are required to check the age of customers who wish to purchase video games.
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were defined by a variation of the Miller test used by the US Supreme Court to determine when
speech was not protected under the First Amendment.

230

The bill was signed into law by Governor

Arnold Schwarzenegger in October of 2005 231 and was set to go into effect in January of 2006.
232

Before the law went into effect, the Entertainment Merchants Association prepared a
lawsuit to overturn the act, fearing that the “violent video game” definition would effect games
that the ESRB system deemed suitable for children and that the law would ultimately harm the
video game industry as a whole.

233

The Plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction in late

2005 by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In 2007, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled for the Plaintiffs in 2007, holding
(1) that the law violated the First Amendment and (2) that there was an insufficient showing of
proof that video games caused violent behavior.

234

Governor Schwarzenegger appealed the District Court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s ruling. Governor Schwarzenegger filed a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in 2009. 235 On June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court
struck down the California law as unconstitutional on the basis of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.

First, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, Justice

Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, held that video games should be afforded First Amendme nt
Protection:

230

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)

231 Hoffman, Gene (September 27, 2010). "How the Wrong Decision in Schwarzenegger v. EMA Could Cripple Video

Game Innovation". Xconomy.com. Retrieved 10-6-2014
232 Thorsen, Tor (2005-10-07). "Schwarzenegger signs game-restriction bill". Gamespot. Retrieved 10-6-2014
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Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary
devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features
distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world).
That suffices to confer First Amendment protection. 236
Justice Scalia further noted that although states may pass laws to block obscene materials from
being distributed to minors, “…speech about violence is not obscene.”

237

Justice Scalia went on

to write that some violent video games are analogous to fairy tales and that even if videogames
were without value to society, “…they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the
best of literature.”

238

Justice Scalia also held that the industry standard ESRB rating system was operating
effectively to regulate the sales of violent video games to minors and the “filling the remaining
modest gap in concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.”

239

Further,

the Court determined by the evidence presented, there were no compelling links between violent
video games and violent acts of minors.

240

In fact, Justice Scalia cited a medical report that

proffered cartoons like Looney Tunes generate the same effect in children as in games like Sonic
the Hedgehog or imagery of guns.

241

Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts. Although Justice
Alito agreed that California’s threshold requirement that guided what material would be covered
was too broad, he felt that there was a potential double standard formed between violent and sexual
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content regarding the threshold.

242

Further, Justice Alito questioned the idea that violent video

games did not have an effect on children.

243

Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the Founding Fathers “believed parents to have
complete authority over their minor children and expected parents to direct the development of
those children.”

244

Moreover, Justice Thomas opined that the intent of the First Amendment "does

not include a right to speak to minors (or a right of minors to access speech) without going through
the minors' parents or guardians."

245

Justice Breyer also dissented in this case. Justice Breyer likened the sale of violent video
games to minors to the sale of pornographic magazines to minors: “But what sense does it make
to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting
a sale to that 13- year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, binds
and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her?”

246

Moreover, Justice Breyer expressed concern

that the self-regulated video game industry still allowed twenty (20) to fifty (50) percent of minors
to purchase violent video games.

247

As stated above, the parents dominate the traditional structure of Italian-Amer ica n
households. It flows naturally, then, that the children are submissive to their parents’ demands.
In this case, Justice Scalia felt that the concerned parent’s interest in the video games their children
play was not a compelling state interest.

248

In this way, Justice Scalia was unwilling to take

control of the parents’ control/household and put it in the power of the state. Justice Scalia found
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that this interest of the parents’ was more appropriate in the parents’ home, thereby conforming to
the typical Italian-American mentality of keeping control in the father and mother’s hands.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Traditional Italian-American values can be seen in many of Justice Scalia’s opinions.

Some are obvious; some are more discreet. However, it is clear that orginalism, in part, is related
to the tendency that Italian-Americans follow their sense of a code. As can be seen througho ut
this paper, Justice Scalia rarely opines on exceptions to long-standing rules of law. Moreover,
Justice Scalia often cites to and follows long-standing rules of law, much like most ItalianAmerican stick to their “code”, whether legal or not. Justice Scalia’s originalism can certainly be
perceived as a product of his Italian-American upbringing and heritage.
Further, in the analyzed opinions where Justice Scalia did not allude to a sense of code or
adherence to tradition, a theme of strong family values can be derived from his writings. Justice
Scalia can be seen deciding in favor of situations that uphold the structure of the family or preserve
“family values”. Although not directly attributable to originalism, preserving a strong structur e
and system can be compared to the concept of originalism that the Constitution is to be interpreted
as written. The Constitution is to be preserved and upheld as an institution; much like an ItalianAmerican family.
So long as Justice Scalia sits on the bench, he will always write his opinions and vote in
connection with orginalism. Through those beliefs, Justice Scalia alludes to his adherence to a
code and his connection with family, which are prevalent features of Italian-American culture. It
is reasonable to expect these themes will permeate through Justice Scalia’s writing in the future.
Further, Justice Scalia is a living embodiment of rispetto; he publically states his opinion and
thereafter adopts a set of obligations to his code and sense of family.
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